Bitcoin Industry Experts Meet to Discuss Quantum Security
Coinbase, Stanford University and Localhost Research recently hosted a closed-door Post-Quantum Bitcoin Workshop at Stanford. The session brought together Bitcoin developers, cryptographers, researchers, institutional custodians and hardware-wallet specialists to examine the technical and operational challenges involved in preparing Bitcoin for a future where sufficiently powerful quantum computers could threaten existing cryptographic systems.
The workshop was structured as a working session rather than a conventional industry conference. Instead of promoting a single solution, participants compared possible approaches, examined practical limitations and identified areas where additional research and engineering are still required.
Coinbase has been working on quantum-readiness for Bitcoin and other blockchain infrastructure throughout 2026. The company previously said that the timeline for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer remains uncertain, while emphasizing that preparation should begin before such a system becomes an immediate threat.
Coinbase — Moving Bitcoin’s Post-Quantum Readiness Forward
Researchers Examine the Main Challenges Facing Bitcoin
The discussions began with the current state of quantum computing and developments in post-quantum cryptography. Participants examined different signature schemes that could potentially be relevant to Bitcoin and considered the tradeoffs associated with adopting them.
The group also looked at lessons from Ethereum's post-quantum planning and considered how institutional custodians would need to manage a transition. Another area of discussion involved potential Bitcoin output types that could provide stronger protection against future quantum attacks.
These questions are not purely theoretical. A post-quantum transition would affect the way Bitcoin keys are generated, stored and used, meaning changes would have to extend beyond the consensus protocol itself.
The afternoon session moved into smaller working groups focused on possible signature schemes, hardware-wallet limitations and methods for protecting Bitcoin that may not be migrated to quantum-resistant systems before a future threat emerges.
Bitcoin Has No Final Quantum-Resistant Solution Yet
One of the clearest conclusions from the workshop was that preparation is more important than attempting to predict exactly when quantum computers will become capable of breaking today's cryptography.
There is currently no agreed date for such a threat. The participants therefore focused on giving Bitcoin enough time to research, test and coordinate a migration before an emergency situation develops.
The approach is consistent with broader post-quantum work in cryptography. The National Institute of Standards and Technology has already finalized standards including ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for digital signatures designed to withstand attacks from future quantum computers, while additional signature candidates continue to be evaluated.
NIST — Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
Different Approaches Carry Different Tradeoffs
Workshop participants considered several possible routes toward quantum-resistant Bitcoin security, but no single approach emerged as the final answer.
Potential solutions can involve significant tradeoffs in areas such as transaction size, cryptographic security, hardware performance, key management and user experience. A solution that is strong from a cryptographic perspective must also be practical enough for wallets, exchanges, custodians and individual users to implement.
Bitcoin developers have already been exploring possible protocol changes. For example, BIP 360 proposes a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output type that removes the key-path spending mechanism associated with Taproot and is designed to reduce exposure to certain long-term quantum attacks. The proposal remains a draft and has not been activated on Bitcoin.
Bitcoin BIP 360 — Pay-to-Merkle-Root
Other proposals address the broader migration problem, including questions around legacy signatures and Bitcoin that remains in vulnerable outputs. These proposals illustrate why the transition is likely to require extensive technical and governance discussion rather than a single protocol change.
The Challenge Extends Beyond Bitcoin's Code
Another major takeaway was that quantum readiness cannot be solved solely by modifying Bitcoin's consensus rules.
Users and institutions would need to generate, store and back up new types of keys. Wallet software would have to support the new cryptographic systems, while custodians would need secure procedures for moving large quantities of customer assets.
Hardware wallets present another layer of complexity. New signature algorithms may have different computational and storage requirements, which means devices must be capable of handling them securely without creating unacceptable usability or performance problems.
For institutional custodians, the challenge becomes even broader. Large-scale migrations require coordination across internal security systems, wallet infrastructure, customer accounts and operational processes. Coinbase has previously highlighted these operational challenges as a major part of its own post-quantum preparation.
Coinbase — Post-Quantum Cryptography Preparation
Bitcoin's Quantum Migration Could Happen in Stages
The workshop also highlighted that a future migration is unlikely to happen as one simple network-wide event.
Post-quantum cryptography is still developing, and the technology considered most suitable today may not necessarily remain the preferred solution over the long term. Bitcoin could therefore need a migration strategy that allows new protections to be introduced progressively while leaving room for future improvements.
That process would require extensive testing and coordination. Wallet developers, custodians, hardware manufacturers, Bitcoin developers and users would all have to adapt their infrastructure before vulnerable assets become an urgent security problem.
Coinbase's Quantum Advisory Council has similarly argued that technical migration work should begin before quantum computing becomes an immediate threat. Its research has also examined the difficult question of what should happen to crypto assets that remain in vulnerable addresses and are never migrated.
Coinbase Quantum Advisory Council — Post-Quantum Migration and Abandoned Coins
Collaboration Becomes Critical for Bitcoin's Next Security Upgrade
The workshop's organizers did not attempt to announce a definitive post-quantum solution. Instead, the session was intended to bring different parts of the Bitcoin ecosystem into the same discussion and make the technical and operational constraints clearer.
That collaboration could become increasingly important as Bitcoin developers evaluate potential signature systems and new output structures. No single company controls Bitcoin's protocol, and a successful migration would require coordination across developers, infrastructure providers, custodians, wallet companies and users.
Coinbase said the Stanford session was the first of a planned series of discussions. The company intends to continue bringing together Bitcoin developers, cryptographers, institutions and other ecosystem participants to turn research into practical solutions.
What the Workshop Means for Bitcoin Users
The immediate message for Bitcoin holders is not that quantum computing has suddenly become an active threat. The workshop instead reflects an effort to address a long-term security issue before it becomes urgent.
Bitcoin's existing cryptographic systems remain in use today, while researchers continue developing and evaluating quantum-resistant alternatives. The difficult part will be creating a solution that is not only cryptographically sound but also practical for millions of users and the institutions that secure Bitcoin on their behalf.
The Stanford workshop therefore represents another step in a much longer process. Its main outcome was not a final protocol decision, but greater coordination around the research, engineering and migration work that Bitcoin may eventually need.
The broader lesson is simple: preparing for a quantum threat requires starting before the threat arrives. For Bitcoin, that means researching possible solutions, testing them under real-world conditions and giving the ecosystem enough time to migrate safely.
